



TRACK II NETWORK OF ASEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS (NADI)
WORKSHOP ON

**“ASEAN STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM WITH MAJOR POWERS
AMID CHANGING WORLD ORDER”**

21st – 22nd June 2023
Via Video Teleconference



Strategic Studies Center,
National Defence Studies Institute,
Royal Thai Armed Forces

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Director : Maj.Gen. Taksin Sirisingha
Deputy Director : Col. Buntoon Bamrerraj
: Gp.Capt. Chaiya Okdaeng
Advising Editors: Gp.Capt. Choosak Kasatewit
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Compiler : Flg.Off. Nittaya Nganwai
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Arts : Pfc. Sorawit Pinrattananon
: Mr. Sakda Panitpichat
English Editor : SM3 Sidaphat Claythanin
: Cpl. Chutharat Boonprasert
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


Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies Institute,
Royal Thai Armed Forces
62 Vibhavadi Rangsit Rd., Dindaeng, Bangkok, 10400, Thailand.
E-mail: rsd.ssc2559@gmail.com, Tel./Fax: +66 2275 5716,
Website: www.sscthailand.org

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
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SESSION I

Keynote Speech on “ASEAN Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers amid Changing World Order”





ASEAN Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers amid Changing World Order

*by Associate Professor Dr. Piti Srisangnam,
Associate Professor in Economics, Chulalongkorn University*

ASEAN needs to position itself as the epicentrum of balance amidst the new world orders. The presentation categorized the new world orders into 6Ds. The first D is Destabilization. Despite many hotspots around the world, three hotspots in Southeast Asia, namely South China Sea, Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, must be closely monitored because Asian countries will suffer the most from any adverse events taking place in these areas. Therefore, these countries should learn from three out of 11 US commands, namely Cyber Command, Strategic Command and Space Command, to respond to the potential threats. The second D is Digital Divided. The digital world is facing the situations of dualities or dualisms. Countries with low digital literacy will suffer from the disruption while those championing technologies gain advantages. This can create technological war. So, those in charge of security should consider comprehensive security measures.

As for the third D, Deglobalization, US globalization concept, related to trade and investment, is challenged by the new concept. In the past, the US was the largest economy and every country used USD as the medium of exchange. It supported the idea of multilateralism encouraging every country to discuss the IMF, World Bank and WTO, of which it held major shares. However, China is now enjoying the largest GDP. So, the world sees it as the first or second trade partner. This leads to the fourth D, Decoupling of the Global Value Chains. It involves trade wars where the US uses a strategic toolbox to create a supply chain disruption to drive China out of the global value chains. It came up with a strategic way, with the chain of command starting from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) that works on trade and investment policies for the country's benefits. The US issues import restrictions, increases baseline tariffs by 25% on Chinese imports, and uses the US extraterritorial jurisdiction of the US domestic laws to implement in other countries. Moreover, it uses the entity list to blacklist five prominent Chinese telecommunication companies. Additionally, it controls technological transfer by having the Department of Commerce and the Department of Justice monitor industrial espionage. Moreover, it will set up the Future Command as the 12th Combatant Command to predict future situations.




The fifth D is De-dollarization. The USD has been the major tool for international trade and investments. However, the US is facing the challenge of de-dollarization because of its irresponsible monetary policy. Its quantitative easing measure caused the highest inflation rate in 50 years. So, it formulated quantitative tightening as a countermeasure, resulting in the money outflows from Southeast Asia back to the US. The second reason is the US's irresponsible fiscal policy. Currently, the public debt ceiling of the US is larger than 3.4 trillion USD. If Congress does not allow the US government to increase the debt ceiling, the US government may default and the bond market will collapse. Because of this situation, all central banks worldwide have started to increase the gold holding instead of USD. Moreover, the US weaponizes financial tools. Intending to create an economic crisis in Russia, it drove Russia out of the SWIFT, the system monitoring the USD flows worldwide, to prevent Russia from utilizing its international reserves. Therefore, other countries find alternatives to USD because they fear that the same situation might happen to them. For instance, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) set up the new currency and debt payment system that will potentially replace USD. Another tool the US uses is the extraterritorial enforcement of the US domestic laws in other countries.

The last D is Degradation of Environment. Trade and investment sectors must consider environmental issues. The European Union set up environmental-saving criteria. For example, the European Green Deal, targeting to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, focuses on agricultural products, such as palm oil and soy. The EU also sets a 'Fit for 55' target on carbon reduction. Furthermore, it introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), calculating the greenhouse gas emission in the production process of steel, iron and aluminum. Only the products that pass the criteria can be sold in Europe. By 2024, the corporate sustainability due diligence will be issued on textile, apparel, agriculture, food and beverage, forest related products, fisheries and mining to monitor the whole production life cycle. This new world order may create a conflict and internal security issue because it is hard for farmers to accept that their activities harm the environment.

SESSION II

Presentation on “ASEAN Challenges and Opportunities from Major Powers Competition amid Global Economic and Geopolitical Shifts”



Brunei Darussalam

Presentation by Ms. Nor Azriah Aziz, Research Officer, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS), Ministry of Defence, Brunei

The presenter highlighted that in order to understand the current opportunities and challenges that major power competition brings for the region, one needs to grasp the significance of Southeast Asia. The plethora of major and middle-power interests in the region presents both opportunities and challenges for ASEAN as well as Southeast Asian countries. As ASEAN is now widely recognized as a significant player in the regional security environment, its increasing geostrategic importance presented ASEAN with more opportunities for relevant parties to explore.

The increased interest in the region has proportionately brought about prospects of cooperation. ASEAN sees the global interest in the region as a welcome development for mostly economic and strategic reasons, contributing to its regional security and stability. While maintaining ASEAN centrality, the region has witnessed increased interest in ASEAN as an opportunity; possessing various extents of potential to consider, but not without its challenges.

The presenter provided two recommendations for ADMM to move forward:

- a. To leverage the growing prospects of cooperation in the region while managing the proliferation of interests with guidelines; this can be done through continuously stock taking ASEAN's initiatives by reassessing and prioritizing relevant cooperation areas of EWGs; to further focus and streamline efforts of cooperation;
- b. To maintain ASEAN's niche of providing platforms to bring people together. At its basis, ASEAN must not lose sight of its ASEAN Way in retaining its distinct elements of togetherness and friendships.



Kingdom of Cambodia



Presentation by Colonel Mel Kunpiseth, Chief of Planning Office, Department of Policy-Planning, General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs (GDPFA), Ministry of National Defence, Cambodia

We all know that in the recent years, Southeast Asia has emerged as a key focal point of US-China strategic competition. The most dangerous environment is one of great power transition, such as that between the United States and China, because both sides pressure others to align with them. Southeast Asian states has been said, “Don’t make us choose sides.” Until recently, as we looked to the United States for security and to China for prosperity. Today, trends toward economic decoupling, friend-shoring and cutting the supply chain that the United States and China are competing economically in an increasingly zero-sum manner that could negatively impact to AMS.

ASEAN faces challenges in navigating major powers' competition, but it also has opportunities to strengthen our economic integration, attract investments, and promote regional stability. By leveraging these opportunities and maintaining our unity and centrality, ASEAN can effectively respond to global economic and geopolitical shifts. The consensus in the international relations that the safest environment for small- and medium states in AMS is balancing of power, in which we can secure political and economic benefits from all sides. For AMS heavily dependent economically on both the United States and China, this was a welcome situation.

Republic of Indonesia (CSSRD, TNI)

Presentation by Major General Agape Zacharia R. Dondokambey, S.E., M.Han, Chief, Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Development (CSSRD) of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)

Major General Agape Zacharia R. Dondokambey highlighted the importance of Strategic Equilibrium for ASEAN which aims to advocate the common interests of its member states, in order to maintain peace and prosperity in the region. It serves ASEAN in adapting to the global challenges amidst geo-political and geo-economic changes in the Southeast Asian region. Strategic Equilibrium will provide opportunities for ASEAN through ADMM and ADMM-Plus to adopt a holistic and collaborative approach to demonstrate that ASEAN matters by being a driver of peace.

He recommended the stronger military cooperation capacity and readiness of ASEAN Member States to maintain strategic balance in the region. These include enhancing defense capabilities, cooperation in military training and exercises, and developing innovative defense technologies. All of this will enable the region to effectively respond to security changes. Nevertheless, stronger cooperation of the ASEAN military needs to be implemented in the following actions:

- a. Cause of action against key perpetrators of crimes against migrant workers and victims of human trafficking by enhancing surveillance from the port of origin and arrival ports. AMS should maintain sharing information related to human trafficking through ACDFM in order to streamline bureaucratic processes.
- b. Uphold the value of inclusivity to engage in dialogue with various parties in Myanmar. In this regard, there should be enhanced cooperation with Myanmar in bilateral military exercises within the ASEAN region, such as joint security patrols.
- c. Provide a sense of security for users of maritime transportation by ensuring consistent implementation of security measures along land, sea, and air distribution routes. These steps are intended to demonstrate the mutual concern of ASEAN member



states in creating a secure region that upholds the value of inclusivity. Major General Agape Zacharia R. Dondokambey highlighted the importance of Strategic Equilibrium for ASEAN that aims to advocate the shared interests of its member states, in order to maintain peace and prosperity in the region. It serves as a concept to hold ASEAN in adapting the global challenges amidst geopolitical and geoeconomic changes in the Southeast Asian region. The opportunities for ASEAN through ADMM and ADMM-Plus lie in adopting a holistic and collaborative approach to demonstrate that ASEAN matters by being a driver of peace.

Lao People's Democratic Republic



Presentation by Brigadier General Viengxay SOMVICHIT, Director General of Military Science and History Department (MSHD), Ministry of National Defence

Brigadier Viengxay SOMVICHIT raised many challenges we are facing especially the shift in international and regional security environment in a more complicated and multi-facets, the strategic competition of influence of the great powers, just to name some. He also highlighted the increase in competition between the great powers has affected to the regional security, politics and economy. The great power rivalry has brought about the prominent division and polarization in the world today. Provided that the issue is still to be developed, it is likely to result in serious confrontation of forces that will surely affect our regional peace, stability and security as well as the economic and people's livelihood.

He also touched on trade war of the great power. The competition in the economic field and the trade alliance of the superpowers is one of the tools that they use as a condition for economic negotiations, especially in the field of energy, technological competition (artificial intelligence), inflation, unemployment and the high cost of living. He urged ASEAN Member States to strengthen the solidarity and cooperation within ASEAN as well as the dialogue partners and the future to enhance the trade market and the economy more widely, promote the investment process and practical cooperation that will strengthen and expand the economy in a comprehensive way as well as enhance the comprehensive strategy of innovation in order to increase the readiness to deal with the current and future challenges. ASEAN must be committed and ensure the maintenance of its centrality in all fronts of cooperation.



Malaysia (MiDAS)



Presentation by Mr. Ahmad Tajuddin bin Mohd Said, Assistant Director Contemporary Security, Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS)

Mr. Ahmad Tajuddin bin Mohd Said highlighted that, amid the challenges from the major powers' competition in the regions, ASEAN has opportunities. While no one can predict how the superpowers' competition will end or how it will end, it is pertinent for ASEAN member states to maintain peace and stability in this region. It allows ASEAN states to remain united and focus on common challenges. All political channels must be open, and communications must continue to ensure that no miscalculation or misjudgment occurs.

Economically, the ASEAN region has strong ties with the US and China. It is, therefore, essential to ensure that the region remains peaceful so that economic flows will continue. The US, China and ASEAN will benefit from the existing trade and foreign direct investments. In parallel, ADMM should relook at and revive the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC) so that it will be part of the ASEAN economic industry. With the assistance of the US and China, new technologies, namely artificial intelligence, geospatial and drones, can be developed together in this region. Therefore, focusing on stability while maintaining all political communication channels remain open, continuing economic growth and improving the ASEAN defence industry should be the way forward.

Republic of the Union of Myanmar



Presentation by Brigadier General San Yu Naing, Assistant Chief of Armed Forces Training (Strategic Studies), Office of the Chief of Armed Forces Training (OCAFT), Myanmar Armed Forces

BG San Yu Naing highlighted that major power competition spans across diplomatic, economic, technological, and military domains and typically involves nations with significant geopolitical and economic interests. AMS encounter challenges in navigating this competition, as they strive to balance the interests and demands of major powers while upholding the principle of non-interference, which faces criticism and prompts calls for reassessment. He also addressed territorial disputes in the South China Sea, where some AMS and China have overlapping claims, posing obstacles to regional stability and cohesion. However, ASEAN is actively collaborating with China to establish the Code of Conduct (COC) as a means to manage conflicts, prevent escalation, and prioritize cooperation to maintain stability and avert armed confrontations. It was cautioned that AMS heavily rely on trade and investment from major powers, and economic rivalries among these powers can expose vulnerabilities, particularly when excessive reliance on a single dominant nation occurs or when trade disputes and protectionist measures adversely affect their economies.

He highlighted ASEAN's establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to enhance economic integration among member states, leveraging the region's sizable market and trade potential to attract major powers and actively pursue partnerships, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. This strengthens the regional economy and addresses vulnerabilities. ASEAN's diplomatic focus and commitment to multilateralism provide opportunities for member states to engage in dialogue and negotiations with major powers. By shaping the regional architecture and frameworks in Southeast Asia, ASEAN promotes cooperation through its centrality in forums like ADMM Plus, ARF, and EAS, fostering dialogue, confidence-building, and conflict resolution. He suggested that ASEAN's neutrality in major power competition, prioritizing regional stability, a rules-based order, and peaceful dispute resolution, facilitates effective navigation of such competition through strong relationships with all powers and dialogue management of tensions. He emphasized major powers' infrastructure development and connectivity initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as opportunities for



AMS to strengthen their infrastructure networks, spur economic growth, and enhance regional connectivity. Furthermore, major power competition incentivizes ASEAN countries to bolster intra-ASEAN cooperation, fostering economic integration, policy alignment, and stronger ties, leading to increased collective influence and resilience against external pressures. He concluded by emphasizing ASEAN's need to maintain unity, strengthen institutional capacity, promote regional integration, and actively shape the regional order amidst major power competition and global shifts to seize opportunities and address challenges.

Republic of the Philippines (NDCP)

Presentation by Ms. Arielle Ann Nicole I Lopez, Senior Defense Research Officer, National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP)

In her presentation, Ms Arielle Ann Nicole Lopez discussed the different challenges and opportunities for ASEAN amid the great power competition within the scope of global economic and geopolitical shifts. Highlighting that ASEAN finds itself in the epicenter of the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, Ms Lopez noted the challenges it poses for the organization in three points. First, the great power competition dynamics revealed internal division among ASEAN resulting in the inability to reach a collective decision. Second, the increasing geopolitical tension between great powers would disrupt regional stability. Third, ASEAN is vulnerable to economic statecraft if employed. It cannot be denied that AMS has different economic alliances and partners among the great powers therefore, making ASEAN vulnerable to external pressures. Nonetheless, the great power competition also brings certain opportunities for the association, which Ms Lopez highlighted in three points. First, ASEAN centrality is the key wherein ASEAN can survive and effectively manage the great power competition. ASEAN is presented with an opportunity to strengthen its centrality and promote its role as the primary regional organization. Second, though ASEAN's neutral stand in the great power competition due to its consensus-based decision making, it is not limited to interacting with any great powers. Therefore, the ASEAN platform can be utilized to discuss and manage the great power competition through dialogue and diplomacy. Third, ASEAN's collective influence as the primary regional organization in Southeast Asia can be utilized in terms of the global economy. ASEAN laid out the foundation for realizing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). This is an opportunity for ASEAN to enhance the AEC for economic resilience as a collective economic market.

Ms. Lopez put forward several recommendations for ASEAN amid the great power competition. First, ASEAN should utilize its platforms for dialogue and diplomacy not only to manage the competition but contribute to norm-setting and shaping the rule-based order, adhering to international law, and promoting peaceful resolutions to competition and disputes and promote itself as a responsible regional actor. Second, ASEAN should take advantage of working with economic middle powers such as Australia and




Japan in terms of economics to prevent economic dependency on great powers such as the United States or China. Finally, ASEAN's economic integration initiatives such as the ASEAN Economic Community should be enhanced specifically on the implementation of providing opportunities for member states to enhance their economic resilience. As a result, ASEAN's collective market can be used as leverage in negotiating beneficial trade agreements and economic cooperation.

SESSION III

Presentation on

“The Roles of ASEAN and AMS in Building a Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers in order to Strengthen Sustainable Stability and Security in the Region”



Republic of Indonesia (RIDU)



Presentation by Brigadier General Dr. Ir. Ari Pitoyo Sumarno., S.A.P., M.M., CIPA., CIT Vice Dean of Defense Strategy Faculty, Republic of Indonesia Defense University (RIDU).

ASEAN's vision is to realize dynamic cooperation among ASEAN member states in a peaceful, stable and prosperous manner. ASEAN's strategic equilibrium in the regional architecture is necessary to establish a rule-based order and prevent extra-regional powers from shaping the region. As one of the world's most dynamic developing regions, Southeast Asia has been a place of intense strategic competition among major powers. This has had multi-dimensional impacts on the regional countries' security and development. In that context, the concern arose from threats such as transnational organized crimes, maritime security, and cyber-attacks.

Southeast Asia is the hub, connecting the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean, with many international maritime lines of communication passing. This places the spotlight on ASEAN's capabilities to manage regional challenges while relying almost exclusively on its norms and diplomatic instruments. Through ASEAN, its member states have sought to maintain both a US strategic commitment to the region and enmesh China in norms of peaceful dispute resolution and a web of regional multilateral fora. Cooperation carried out by ASEAN and China as well as ASEAN and the US is a form of attaining strategic equilibrium in maintaining regional stability. ASEAN and China have forged cooperation in several areas, including climate change, cybersecurity, and maritime security. Meanwhile, ASEAN and US cooperation is more specific in handling terrorism, the maritime environment, and addressing climate change. ASEAN-China and ASEAN-US cooperation is an important step towards achieving security, sustainability and stability in the Southeast Asian region. Through NADI, it would be possible to extend the recommendations for ASEAN forums in the context of achieving strategic equilibrium.



Malaysia (NDUM)



Presentation by Dr.Tharishini Krishnan, Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM)

The current geopolitical dynamics of the international system showcase that the region of Southeast Asia (SEA) is a major playground for major power rivalries and competition. Despite myriads of national interest and different degrees of alignments amongst AMS which may pose a challenge to ASEAN as a regional organization, AMS has remained vigilant in responding to major powers in the region. It has always been the cornerstone of AMS to emphasize and continue to highlight that ASEAN has never built upon or as a grouping of proxy to any powers. Nonetheless, the region will have to continue to enhance ASEAN resilience against any form of actions and behaviors that may dilute the centrality of ASEAN.

Hence, ASEAN must continue to uphold the fundamental underpinning of the organization to promote peace and stability in the region. In building a strategic equilibrium with major powers that may have interest in the region, AMS should continue to respect the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which emphasizes the strong need to settle dispute and conflict with peaceful means. This also goes with the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) which builds on a strong deterrence against any possible nuclear threats to the region. ASEAN should also continue to push major powers to engage actively with ASEAN-led mechanisms which have served effectively for the region. In this way, ASEAN will be able to preserve its institutional characteristics and the core values of ASEAN. Furthermore, it will ensure that AMS will continue to play the leading role and be at the driver seat in addressing key security issues pertaining to the region.

Republic of the Philippines (OSSSM)

Presentation by Colonel MYROADE R DE LEON PAF (GSC), Assistant Chief, Office of Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM), Armed Forces of the Philippines

COL. De Leon highlighted the meaning of strategic equilibrium in which countries are not forced to choose but are free to make their own sovereign choices. For that reason, the concept of ASEAN Centrality was developed to lessen geographical competition and zero-sum game which will increase cooperation within the region. Nevertheless, there are still challenges that need to be addressed by the region. One is poly-crisis which is the interaction of present and future risks that has a compounding effect where the risk outweighs the benefit. Second is the member states have different geopolitical objectives and interests, and lastly is the question on the credibility of ASEAN as a regional organization. Despite the challenges mentioned, two overarching roles must be achieved by ASEAN, the first is to be united despite the differences between the member-states to enhance its internal relations to build mutual trust and confidence in the region. Another role is the enhancement of ASEAN Centrality by building on the regional mechanisms and dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, and ASEAN +3 among others which will yield long-term peace and prosperity in the region.

ASEAN must also adapt a balanced policy by welcoming policies of both US and China. One model of interest of the region is the Philippines under President Marcos Jr., where he stated that the country is a friend to all, and enemy to none. He made this possible by conducting state visits to different countries such as Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore. To this end, the following are the recommendations by OSSSM Philippines:

- a. ASEAN should set their rules by not allowing great powers to have unilateral influence in the region. This will be possible by addressing their own internal issues and enhancing their partnerships and dialogues through with external nations.
- b. To foster ASEAN's strategic equilibrium, they should be able to speak in one voice on common issues and challenges, whether internal or external.
- c. Lastly, is for ASEAN to continue the concept of host diplomacy to gain international recognition on the role of ASEAN as a cohesive and diplomatic organization. This was already seen last



2022 when Cambodia, Indonesia, and Thailand have chaired the ASEAN, the G20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The success of the member-states chairmanship will go a long way in expanding the region's credibility. This will yield more partnerships and dialogues that will benefit the region in the long term.

Republic of Singapore



Presentation by Mr. Henrick Tsjeng, Associate Research Fellow (Regional Security Architecture Programme), Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

In his presentation, Mr Tsjeng highlighted how, during the 20th Shangri-La Dialogue, the speeches made by the Chinese and US defence chiefs reflected their respective countries' dueling visions of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The United States focused heavily on bolstering US alliances and partnerships, as well as the AUKUS partnership and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). In contrast, China gave more airtime to Beijing's engagement with ASEAN while providing a picture of China's benign plans for the world. However, Beijing's belligerence towards the United States and its allies also point to a far more exclusionary vision of order than ASEAN, as a whole, would be comfortable with, while also glossing over China's own conduct in the South China Sea. In this context, ASEAN must continue constructive engagement with the US and its allies, while maintaining close economic ties with China and yet insisting on an inclusionary regional security architecture.

Mr Tsjeng concluded that ASEAN must continue to skillfully navigate this rivalry, addressing the ever-mounting challenges to its unity, centrality and, ultimately, relevance in the regional architecture, while maintaining its strategic equilibrium between the great powers. He made the following recommendations to that end:

- a. ASEAN should continue to use its convening power to continue dialogue with both the United States and China and encourage both great powers to engage with each other through ASEAN-led mechanisms.
- b. ASEAN should also continue and strengthen dialogue and cooperation with middle powers in the wider Indo-Pacific region, in the spirit of inclusiveness and multilateralism.
- c. ASEAN should strengthen its internal cohesion and present a unified front when dealing with extra-ASEAN countries, including in the defence domain. One way would be through the conduct of joint military exercises among AMS.



Kingdom of Thailand



Presentation by Colonel Sarawuth Benjajinda, General Staff Officer to Strategic Studies Center (SSC), National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), Royal Thai Armed Forces

Other than non-traditional security challenges, the competing relationship between the US and China is another major security concern, seriously affecting stability and prosperity of the Southeast Asia region. The competition between the two major powers has inevitably posed significant challenges to the regional security as follows: (1) Geopolitical Tensions: both major powers have close relationship with ASEAN Member States (AMS), either economic or security dimensions. Therefore, the competing relationship will certainly create the uncertainties of security environment and eventually threaten regional stability. (2) Regional Internal Division: ASEAN Member States might finally have to choose sides or engage in partisan divides. This will lead to regional internal division within ASEAN. (3) Undermining Inclusive Development: since the contest becomes more intensive, the confrontation will ultimately expand to various dimensions. Consequently, this will cause negative impacts on the development of each state as well as impede regional cooperation.

To build an appropriate strategic equilibrium, recommendations are as follows: (1) Building trust and confidence: this is a starting point to create effective cooperation. Certainly, this process requires time. To start with, AMS should have more frequent dialogues on common security issues. After that, working together on mutual interests will have to be conducted more regularly. By working jointly, the more trust and confidence we will eventually result in more security. (2) Maintaining regional unity: AMS should foster the sense of responsibility and collective spirit towards the common goal by balancing national interests with ASEAN's. (3) Promoting ASEAN's leading roles in addressing common regional challenges and the concept of ASEAN centrality: by doing so, AMS will also be able to avoid the trap of being forced to choose sides, as well as be able to exercise their domestic and foreign policy freely. (4) Promoting creative competition between major powers: ASEAN should find ways to build greater equilibrium by playing a bridging role among major powers. This will support our efforts to create truly regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam




Presentation by Colonel Vu Cao Dinh, Deputy Director, Department of International Studies, Institute for Defense Strategy (IDS), Ministry of National Defence

The world has, recently, witnessed many rapidly evolving great changes, which accelerate the process of reshaping the world's order in terms of politics, security and economics. Asia - Pacific, including Southeast Asia, is not an exception, and has become a place of intensified competition among great powers, especially between China and the U.S. This requires ASEAN to maintain its centrality and harmonise interests of its member states, while balancing relations with major powers. ASEAN, however, is currently facing some challenges such as: (i) Internal division within ASEAN due to the influence of major powers; (ii) Huge disparities in development level, economy size, per capita income; (iii) Disputes over territorial sovereignty remain unsolved among AMS; (iv) Some AMS have their own problems, which threaten security and political stability in the region, and may cause tensions among AMS as well as affect the centrality of ASEAN.

In order to maintain a peaceful, stable, and secure environment in the context of complex developments in the region and the world, while ensuring its centrality, AMS need to focus on: (i) Strictly maintaining the principle of “inclusiveness and neutrality” in relations with the great powers; (ii) Promoting resolution of conflicts and disputes through consultation, mediation and conciliation; (iii) Actively implementing cooperative mechanisms and initiatives to maintain its centrality; (iv) Proactively approaching its potential partners to create effective tools, standards and mechanisms, which aim to achieve a strategic balance and build confidence and trust to prevent conflicts, especially in the South China Sea as well as in other disputed areas; (v) Closely promoting connectivity among AMS in order to improve capacity, resilience and adaptability of AMS to impacts of traditional and nontraditional security challenges.

Summary of Discussion




Under World Trade Organization rules, Hong Kong (H.K.) should be treated like separate country, but they're official

Summary of Discussion



1. The application of ASEAN Minus X formula in addressing challenges was brought up by one of the NADI delegates during one of the discussions on the prospects of reviewing ASEAN's core principles. In response, it was highlighted that while this may be considered, it has the potential to implicate ASEAN's default mechanism for collectively addressing important issues of common concerns. Ultimately, it was stressed that it is also important for ASEAN to display solidarity and unity.
2. There was a proposal that ASEAN should contextualize "ASEAN neutrality" in the light of international law. AMS should communicate to the entire world that ASEAN neutrality is not unlimited and unqualified but is rather based on international law and basic norms of good conduct, including but not limited to the freedom of navigation, good order at sea, and avoidance of the use or threat of use of force.

Recommendations




Recommendations




1. In light of increasing interests from external countries, both major and middle powers, the ASEAN defence sector must remain aware of the resulting challenges to ASEAN centrality and therefore, must take the appropriate steps to promote and strengthen ASEAN-led mechanisms which may include a review of ASEAN's principles and processes.
2. AMS should enhance defence capabilities through joint military training, exercise and defence industry in order to maintain ASEAN cohesion with the focus of handling the Non-Traditional Security Threats as a part of ASEAN centrality.
3. ASEAN should maintain the principles of neutrality in its relations with the major powers. This is consistent with ASEAN supporting initiatives by any major power as long as they are in line with international law and ASEAN's interests.
4. ASEAN should continue its distinct efforts and convening power to bring together countries and people in the spirit of friendship and mutual respect.
5. ASEAN should continue to maintain the principle of 'inclusiveness' in its relations with the major powers to address common concerns in the region.
6. In dealing with internal and external challenges, ASEAN should speak in one voice when engaging with major powers, through collective decisions that will strengthen ASEAN solidarity and resilience.
7. ASEAN should reiterate to the signatories their rights and obligations under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). These countries have also expressed their support for the ASEAN charter, which is consistent with the UN Charter.
8. ASEAN should build greater equilibrium by cooperation with major powers in issues such as cyber security, counterterrorism, climate change, and maritime security to promote constructive competition between major powers.

Annex



Annex I

List of Participants





List of Participants



Brunei Darussalam	
1	<p>Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS), Ministry of Defence, Brunei</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Abdul Malik Kamis Acting Director, SHHBIDSS2. Noorhazwani binti Haji Ariffin Acting Assistant Director, SHHBIDSS3. Nor Azriah binti Dato Seri Setia Haji Abdul Aziz Research Officer, SHHBIDSS4. Hajah Siti Diana binti Haji Othman Research Officer, SHHBIDSS5. Siti Nurnabilah binti Haji Abdul Rahman Research Officer, SHHBIDSS6. Muizzah binti Haji Harun Research Officer, SHHBIDSS7. Mohammad Umair Akmal bin Haji Mohammad Noor Ahsffian Research Officer, SHHBIDSS
Cambodia	
2	<p>General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs (GDPFA), Ministry of National Defense, Cambodia</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Brigadier General Ngor Sopheap, Deputy Director of ASEAN Affairs Department, GDPFA2. Colonel Mel Kunpiseth, Chief of Planning Office of Policy and Planning Department, GDPFA3. Captain Sok Sann, Deputy Chief of Law and ASEAN Policy Management Office, ASEAN Affairs Department, GDPFA



Indonesia	
3	Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Development of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (CSSRD-TNI) <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Major General Agape Zacharia R. Dondokambey, S.E., M.Han. Chief, CSSRD-TNI2. Commodore Antonius Widoyutomo, S.H., M.Tr. Opsla Director of Strategic Studies, CSSRD-TNI3. Colonel Marines M.J. Siregar, S.T., M.Tr.Hanla, M.M. Head of Military Cooperation Studies4. Colonel Army R.H.P., Tambunan, M.Han. Head of Military Operations Other Than War Studies5. Commander Miknamara, M.Tr.Hanla Head of Sub Division of Military Logistics Studies6. Semmy Tyar Armandha Staff
4	Republic of Indonesian Defense University (RIDU) <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. MG. Dr. Priyanto, S.I.P., M.Si(Han), Dean of Defense Strategy Faculty, RIDU2. BG. Dr. Ir. Ari Pitoyo Sumarno., S.A.P., M.M., CIPA., CIT, Vice Dean for Academic and Student Affairs of the Defense Strategy Faculty, RIDU3. Captain Navy Dr. Rudy Sutanto, S.I.P., M.M., CIQaR., CIT, Lecturer of Defense Strategy Faculty, RIDU4. Dr. Fauzia G. Cempaka Timur, S.I.P., M.Si(Han), Lecturer of Defense Strategy Faculty, RIDU
Lao PDR	
5	Department of Military Science and History (MSHD), Ministry of National Defence <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. BG. Viengxay Somvichith, Director General of Military Science and History Department, Ministry of National Defence, HOD

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. COL. Phonethong Phanchaleunphon, Deputy Director General of Military Science and History Department, Ministry of National Defence 3. MAJ. Ms. Vanny Phaengkeo, Director of Foreign Relations Division, Ministry of National Defence 4. CPT. Phansi Bounmixay, Staff Officer of Foreign Relations Division, Ministry of National Defence
Malaysia	
<p>6</p>	<p>Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mej Jen Dato' Hj Ya'cob bin Hj Samiran Chief Executive MiDAS 2. Kol Nik Amir bin Nik Yaacob, Director Defence Diplomacy 3. Lt Kol Juma'in bin Saadon RMAF Assistant Director Defence Diplomacy 4. Lt Kol Mohamed Rosly bin Darasid Assistant Director Defence Diplomacy 5. En Ahmad Tajuddin bin Mohd Said Assistant Director Contemporary Security
<p>7</p>	<p>Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lieutenant General Datuk Haji Abdul Halim Bin Haji Jalal (Retired) Principal Fellow 2. Dr Tharishini Krishnan Research Fellow 3. Lt Col Abdul Rahman bin Alavi (R) Head, Centre for Peace Studies 4. Dr. Azrul Azlan bin Abdul Rahman Research Fellow 5. Madam Nur Syafiqah binti Mohd Yazib Research Fellow 6. Madam Aqilah binti Md Pazil Research Officer



Myanmar

**8 Office of the Chief of the Armed Forces Training (OCAFT),
Ministry of Defence, Republic of the Union of Myanmar**

1. Major General Myint Kyaw Tun
Deputy Chief of Armed Forces Training (Strategic Studies)
2. Colonel Sein Min Tun
Head of Department
3. Major Nyan Myo Kyaw
General Staff Officer

Philippines

9 National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP)

1. LtGen Ferdinand M Cartujano Paf (Ret)
President, National Defense College of the Philippines
2. Mr. Manmar C Francisco
Acting Chief, Research and Special Studies Division
3. Ms. Christine Lissette M Castillo
Defense Research Officer
4. Mr. Vince Andre C Sabellon
Defense Research Officer
5. Ms. Gabriela Paulette D Domanais
GAD Researcher
6. Ms. Arielle Ann Nicole I Lopez
Senior Defense Research Officer
7. Mr. Erick Nielson C Javier
Defense Research Officer
8. Ms. Sandra Corinne A Perdido
Training Specialist

**10 Office of Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM),
Armed Forces of the Philippines**

1. COL HAROUN-AL-RASHID I JAJI PA (GSC)
Chief, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management
2. COL MYROADE R DE LEON PAF (GSC)

	<p>Assistant Chief, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management</p> <p>3. COL PRIMO C DAQUIOAG JR PA (GSC) Chief, Strategic Studies Division, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management</p> <p>4. CPT SHERHANNAH S PAISO (PROF) Assistant Chief, Strategic Studies Division, OSSSM</p> <p>5. Mr. Emmanuel Nikolai P. Ochoco Defense Analyst, Strategic Studies Division, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management</p> <p>6. Ms. Merlina R. Magdangal Defense Analyst, Policy Studies Division, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management</p> <p>7. Ms. Melissa Grace A. Quierrez Defense Analyst, Strategic Studies Division, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management</p> <p>8. Mr. Kim Wilhelm T. Perez Defense Analyst, Strategic Studies Division, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management</p>
Singapore	
<p>11</p>	<p>S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)</p> <p>1. Mr Lawrence Anderson Senior Fellow, RSIS, NTU</p> <p>2. Mr Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS, NTU</p> <p>3. Mr Henrick Tsjeng Associate Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS, NTU</p>
Thailand	
<p>12</p>	<p>Strategic Studies Center (SSC), National Defense Studies Institute (NDSI), Royal Thai Armed Forces</p> <p>1. Major General Taksin Sirisingha Director of SSC</p>



	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Group Captain Chaiya Okdaeng, Deputy Director of SSC 3. Group Captain Choosak Kasatewit Director of Regional Studies Division, SSC 4. Colonel Sarawuth Benjajinda General Staff Officer to SSC 5. Flight Lieutenant Siwalee Sirirojborirak Researcher, Regional Studies Division, SSC 6. Flying Officer Nittaya Nganwai Researcher, Regional Studies Division, SSC 7. Mr. Sittichai Sukata, Researcher, Regional Studies Division, SSC 8. Miss Napit Kornpakawatjinda, Researcher, Regional Studies Division, SSC
Vietnam	
13	<p>Institute for Defense Strategy (IDS), Ministry of National Defence</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Col. Vu Cao Dinh Deputy Director of the International Studies Department, IDS 2. Col. Hoang Van Canh Research Officer, IDS

Annex II

Agenda






Agenda



1. Opening Remarks by Major General Taksin Sirisingha,
Director of Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies
Institute (SSC, NDSI)
2. Adoption of Agenda
3. **Session I:** Presentation by keynote Speaker on the **“ASEAN Strategic
Equilibrium with Major Powers amid Changing World Order”**
4. **Session II:** Presentation by NADI delegations, 10 minutes for each
member on **“ASEAN Challenges and Opportunities from Major
Powers Competition amid Global Economic and Geopolitical Shifts”**
5. **Session III:** Presentation by NADI delegations, 10 minutes for each
member on **“The Roles of ASEAN and AMS in Building a
Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers in order to Strengthen
Sustainable Stability and Security in the Region”**
6. Other Matters
7. Consideration of the Chairman’s Report
8. Closing Remarks by Major General Taksin Sirisingha,
Director of Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies
Institute (SSC, NDSI)

Annex III

Programme





Programme

Tuesday, 20th June 2023

BANGKOK TIME (GMT +7)	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
0900 - 1100	A dry run of the meeting	
Day 1: Wednesday, 21st June 2023		
BANGKOK TIME (GMT +7)	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
0730 - 0830	Video Conference system logged on and Technical Test	Delegations are kindly requested to be logged on an hour prior to the starting time of the meeting
0830 – 0840	Opening Ceremony Opening Remarks by Major General Taksin Sirisingha, Director of Strategic Studies Center (SSC), National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI)	
0840 – 0855	- Group Photo	1. All Head of Delegates 2. All Delegates
	- Introduction of NADI Members	
0855 - 0900	Adoption of Agenda	
0900 - 1000	<u>SESSION I:</u> Keynote Speech on the “ ASEAN Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers amid Changing World Order ” - Associate Professor Dr. Piti Srisangnam Executive Director, ASEAN Foundation	
1000 - 1020	Break	



Day 1: Wednesday, 21 st June 2023		
BANGKOK TIME (GMT +7)	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
1020 - 1130	SESSION II: Presentation on the “ ASEAN Challenges and Opportunities from Major Powers Competition amid Global Economic and Geopolitical Shifts ”	- Brunei (SHHBIDSS) - Cambodia (GDPFA) - Indonesia (CSSRD, TNI) - Lao PDR (MSHD) - Malaysia (MiDAS) - Myanmar (OCAFT) - Philippines (NDCP)
1130 - 1200	Discussions and Recommendations	30 minutes
Day 1: Wednesday, 21 st June 2023 (Continued)		
BANGKOK TIME (GMT +7)	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
1300 – 1330	SESSION III: Presentation on the “ The Roles of ASEAN and AMS in Building a Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers in order to Strengthen Sustainable Stability and Security in the Region ”	- Indonesia (RIDU) - Malaysia (NDUM) - Philippines (OSSSM)
1330 – 1345	Break	
1345 – 1415	SESSION III (Continued): Presentation on the “ The Roles of ASEAN and AMS in Building a Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers in order to Strengthen Sustainable Stability and Security in the Region ”	- Singapore (RSIS) - Thailand (SSC) - Vietnam (IDS)
1415 – 1445	Discussions and Recommendations	30 minutes
1445 - 1515	Other Matters	30 minutes



Day 2: Thursday, 22 nd June 2023		
BANGKOK TIME (GMT +7)	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
0730 - 0830	Video Conference system logged on and Technical Test	Delegations are kindly requested to be logged on an hour prior to the starting time of the meeting
0830 - 1000	Consideration of Chairman's Report	
1000 - 1015	Break	
1015 – 1130	Consideration of Chairman's Report (Continued)	
1130 – 1150	Final Expression Head of Delegations to NADI Members	
1150 - 1200	Closing Ceremony Closing Remarks by Major General Taksin Sirisingha, Director of Strategic Studies Center (SSC), National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI)	
	Group Photo	



Annex IV

Photos






Photos









ASEAN FOUNDATION
ANALYTICAL
INSTITUTE OF THE ASEAN
REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

Epicentrum of Balance: ASEAN Amidst the New World Order


Piti Srisangnam, PhD
Executive Director of the ASEAN
Foundation
Associate Professor in Economics,
Chulalongkorn University






Piti Srisangnam 09:34

Supply Chain Disruption




Import Restrictions

- Executive Order 13887 tariffs to target unfair trading practices
- 20% increase in tariff rates for most Chinese-made products not including other tariffs
- Higher Foreign Labor Protection Act (FLTPA) increases potential supply chain risks
- Quarantine China tariffs to the #1 priority for U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP)
- Continued use of Section 301 national security tariffs on imported steel and aluminum
- Further increases in U.S. economic sanctions in North, Central, and Counteracting Duty issues
- Trade and investment are being U.S. companies to seek alternative suppliers - both domestically and internationally




Critical Infrastructure

- Executive Order 13883 on Securing the U.S. Bank Payment System (revised)
- Recent news published the import of certain Chinese and other foreign products no longer to be used in the U.S. electrical grid
- Responsibility for the cyber administration: likely to be moved by a future Republican administration
- New Department of Energy (DOE) investigations into Chinese access to the U.S. energy grid and other critical infrastructure
- Focus on cybersecurity vulnerabilities and foreign-employment issues
- Continued, expanding regional Security Commissions about China, Russia, and other foreign disruption of U.S. Critical Infrastructure




Government Contracting

- Section 889 Restrictions prohibit the sale of certain foreign-made goods to U.S. Government agencies, especially in cases involving Chinese goods
- Focus on cybersecurity, telecommunications equipment and other sensitive equipment from 3 prominent Chinese companies:
 - Huawei
 - ZTE
 - Japanet
 - Huawei
 - Dahe
- Also prohibits U.S. Government contractors from using such goods in their own facilities, even if they never sell those products to a government agency




Grid of video thumbnails showing various participants in the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions meeting.







Piti Srisangnam 09:34

Recording

| Page 58







Promoting ASEAN's leading roles in addressing common regional challenges and the concept of ASEAN centrality:

- Regional platform in dealing with major powers
- Consolidate ASEAN's neutral position



ASEAN Strategic Equilibrium with Major Powers amid Changing World Order

THE ROLES OF ASEAN AND AMS IN BUILDING A STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM WITH MAJOR POWERS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN SUSTAINABLE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION

AT TRACK II NETWORK OF ASEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS (NADI) WORKSHOP
VIETNAM PERCEPTION




and adaptability of AMS to impacts of traditional and nontraditional security challenges.

Summary of discussion

37. There was a question regarding ASEAN Minus X formula whether it should be based on consensus or majority vote. A delegate suggested that AMS should collectively address major conflicts and crisis in the region, such as South China Sea.
38. There was a proposal that ASEAN should contextualize 'ASEAN neutrality' in the light of international law. AMS should communicate to the entire world that despite its neutrality, they will not remain neutral if other countries violate the international law and harm ASEAN countries.

Recommendations


39. To build **trust and confidence**, which is a starting point to create effective cooperation, AMS should have dialogues and work together more regularly on common security issues. This will lead to trust, confidence and positive result.
40. AMS should enhance defence capabilities through joint military training and exercise in order to maintain internal cohesion with the focus of handling the Non-Traditional Security Threats.





Annex V

Terms of References (TOR)



Terms of References (TOR)

Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI)



The Terms of Reference serves as reference and guidelines for all meetings, workshops and other undertakings conducted under the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI).

A. Introduction

1. The Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) was initiated in August 2007 by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, as the Track II think tank group to support the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). The inaugural meeting was attended by representatives from Track II institutions of ASEAN members.
2. The establishment of NADI was timely and necessary to discuss, in a Track II setting, issues of defence and security cooperation that the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers or ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) had raised, as well as fresh ideas and issues that are ahead of the curve, and can contribute to further enhancing ADMM cooperation and its cooperation with the Plus countries.
3. While all NADI members would be aware of the positions taken at the ASEAN Leaders Summit, ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting and the ADMM, NADI participants are encouraged to discuss issues and ideas in their personal capacities so that they can go beyond their national positions and to suggest relevant inputs and policy recommendations, without attribution to any participants but as a collective view of the meeting, to the ADMM track.
4. The informal Track II platform offers an environment more conducive to an open discussion of defence and security cooperation in ASEAN as



well as raising ideas and proposals that may be deemed sensitive to be formally tabled at an official Track I meeting.

B. Aims

1. NADI aims to perform the following functions and roles:
 - a. A forum to network, promote dialogue, build confidence and familiarity among ASEAN think tanks and research institutions to facilitate closer cooperation.
 - b. A useful academic forum for policy analysts specialising in defence and security issues, academics researching security cooperation and defence officials to discuss issues of defence and security cooperation including those that the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers have raised.
 - c. A forum where NADI participants can express opinions beyond their respective governments' positions, to provide timely and new ideas as well as relevant recommendations to the ADMM Track to enhance ADMM cooperation and its cooperation with the Plus countries as well as to promote closer cooperation among militaries of the ASEAN.
 - d. A forward-looking platform to discuss issues relating to current and future defence and security challenges as well as opportunities for cooperation.

C. Principles of NADI meetings & activities

1. The core NADI institution of each ASEAN country will act as focal contact point. The list of NADI institutions will be updated periodically.
2. Membership in NADI is limited to Track II institutions among ASEAN members only. Only delegates from the core and partner NADI institutions can attend the NADI Annual Meetings, Retreats and



Workshops. However, the core and partner institutions may bring in representatives from other think tanks and officials to participate in their personal capacities as observers or resource persons.

3. NADI participants may present their national positions in their presentations. However, in discussing fresh ideas and issues, the participants shall do so in their personal capacity. This encourages participants to think creatively and innovatively on defence and security issues beyond their respective government's positions and to contribute fresh and relevant ideas and recommendations to the ASEAN defence track and the ADMM process. This shall ensure ideas and recommendations submitted to the ADMM are not attributed to any particular NADI member.
4. All NADI activities are to be conducted in a closed-door manner without major media publicity
5. The Chairman shall at the end of each NADI Meeting, Workshop or Retreat, submit the Chairman's Report to the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) for their information and attention, and for ADMM's consideration. The NADI Chairman will inform all heads of the NADI institutions and the NADI Secretariat of this action. The NADI Secretariat will only upload the NADI Chairman's Report onto the NADI website after ADSOM has been informed.
6. NADI members have agreed that NADI should remain the Track II forum to advise the ADMM, and membership should not be expanded to include any non-ASEAN country. This NADI position was highlighted during the 8th NADI Annual Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in 2015.
7. NADI members may consider the development of activities, on an ad-hoc basis, with relevant think-tanks from within and outside ASEAN that specialise on defence and strategic issues of importance. Any engagement shall be determined by consensus. NADI must ensure that ASEAN remains in the driver's seat in such engagements, which must not affect NADI's established processes.



8. Bearing in mind the need to keep membership at a practical number to facilitate discussion, new institutions wishing to join NADI must secure the sponsorship of its host government and the consensus of all existing members. Any member institution that wishes to exit NADI must formally announce its intention to leave and provide a plan for a new institution from the exiting institution's country to take its place. This does not apply to any country that has more than one institution represented at NADI.

D. Arrangement of NADI Meeting & Activities

1. NADI Annual Meeting:

- a. The main purpose of the Annual Meeting is to review activities conducted throughout the year, revisit important points made and brainstorm on new ideas for the upcoming year. The delegations could also review the regional political and security environment and identify emerging challenges to peace and stability in the region.
- b. The NADI Annual Meeting shall meet once a year and shall cover two working days, which may include a visit programme. The Annual Meeting is usually held either in March or April. This should be held as a physical meeting, unless prevented by serious difficulties such as constraints imposed by a pandemic. For the conduct of virtual meetings, please refer to Annex II.
- c. The programme for the NADI Annual Meeting should include a meeting with the Leader of the ADSOM for an exchange of views and for the NADI Chairman to brief ADSOM and for NADI members to have a better understanding of ADSOM's areas of interest. The NADI Chair can exercise flexibility over the timing of this meeting, as long as it is held within the first day.
- d. New Workshops for the year can be proposed under the agenda item 'Other Matters'. The NADI delegation proposing a new workshop

should give a brief presentation on the theme, purpose and objectives of the workshop, for consideration of the Annual Meeting. It is highly recommended that NADI members should plan their Workshops in advance, so that NADI members will have ample time for preparations. NADI members are strongly encouraged to propose Workshops at the Annual Meeting and use subsequent Workshops to update the other members of the agendas and other details of their proposed Workshops.

- e. The hosting of the annual NADI Meeting shall be rotated alphabetically to coincide with the ASEAN country holding the Chairmanship of the ADMM.
- f. The host's invitation letters to NADI core and partner institutions, and the NADI Secretariat should be sent out at least two months before the Annual Meeting together with (a) the agenda, (b) the programme, (c) administrative notes to provide information on hotel accommodations, hotel rates, weather, local transport arrangements and (d) reply form on participation and delegation list, request for accommodation bookings, and the flight details (arrival and departure) of delegation.
- g. NADI members shall pay for their own return air tickets, hotel accommodation and other personal expenses (telephone/fax services, laundry, mini bar, internet). However, host countries may offer to pay for the hotel accommodation of heads of delegations if they wish.
- h. The host country shall provide participants with conference facilities and other local hospitalities.
- i. By the end of the Annual Meeting, the Chairman shall submit the agreed Chairman's Report to ADSOM for their attention and for ADMM's consideration. The Chairman's Report could include the NADI schedule of annual activities.



2. NADI Workshops:

- a. The main purpose of the Workshops is to discuss specific defence and security issues that were agreed on; and come up with a collective list of recommendations on how the issue should be dealt with.
- b. The hosting of NADI Workshops is on a voluntary basis and does not have to be in an alphabetical order. The workshop should be on a topic that can further enhance ADMM cooperation as well as cooperation among the militaries of the ASEAN countries.
- c. NADI Workshops shall, as far as possible, be organised **2–3 times** a year after the conduct of the Annual Meeting for that year. Each Workshop shall cover 2 working days. The host may offer site visit during the Workshop. The Workshop should be held physically, unless prevented by serious difficulties such as constraints imposed by a pandemic. For the conduct of virtual workshops, please refer to Annex II .
- d. The scheduled Workshops may be arranged to be conducted every **3–4 months**. This is to provide ample time for substantive preparations as well as budgetary concerns.
- e. The host’s invitation letters to NADI core and partner institutions, and the NADI Secretariat should be sent out at least two months before the Workshop together with (a) the agenda, (b) the programme, (c) administrative notes to provide information on hotel accommodations, hotel rates, weather, local transport arrangements and (d) reply form on participation and delegation list, request for accommodation bookings, and the flight details (arrival and departure) of delegation.
- f. NADI members shall pay for the return air tickets and hotel accommodations of the heads as well as members of the delegations.

- g. The host country shall provide participants with conference facilities and other local hospitalities.
 - h. The final outcome of the Workshop's report shall capture substantive discussions and recommendations agreed upon at the Workshop. The Chairman of the NADI Workshop shall submit the Chairman's Report to the ADSOM Chairman for circulation to ADSOM members for consideration.
 - i. Any matters pertaining to NADI activities and other issues to be followed up from the NADI Annual Meeting could be taken up under agenda item 'Other Matters'.
3. NADI Retreat:
- a. The NADI Retreat should be organised and hosted by the NADI Chair when necessary.
 - b. The purpose of Retreats, among others is to provide longer term recommendations for cooperation to the ADMM and its related meetings.
 - c. For convenience, the NADI Retreat could be held back-to-back with the NADI Annual Meeting or a NADI Workshop hosted by the NADI Chair. If a Retreat is held back-to-back with an Annual Meeting or Workshop, the total duration of the combined event can be up to two and a half working days.

E. Secretariat

1. RSIS, as agreed in the 1st NADI Meeting, shall be the main Secretariat of NADI.
2. The main role of the Secretariat is to provide an update on the current status of NADI activities and its website.
3. At the request of some NADI core institutions, the NADI Secretariat could provide advice on the conduct of NADI Annual Meetings and Workshops, and on the agenda of these activities.



F. NADI Website

1. With the agreement of all the NADI members, RSIS launched the NADI Website (www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi) in 2009, and continues to maintain it. The NADI Website highlights the work of NADI and maintains a record of the Chairman’s Reports of the NADI annual meetings and workshops.
2. Each Chairman’s Report, along with its related annexes such as the agenda and programme, is to be uploaded onto the NADI Website by the NADI Secretariat after the host of the NADI event has submitted it to ADSOM and the ADMM track for their consideration.
3. The costs of maintaining the Website are borne by RSIS.

G. Review of TOR

1. The Terms of Reference shall be reviewed as needed.

Note

The NADI Terms of Reference (TOR) was proposed by the Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS) in March 2013 for consideration of the 6th NADI Annual Meeting in Brunei Darussalam. The TOR was agreed to on 7 March 2013. A second update was conducted following suggestions from NADI delegations during the NADI Workshop held in Bali in October 2015. Consequently, a request was made by NADI delegations during the Workshop held by Cambodia in October 2021, to update the NADI TOR to better reflect the practice of NADI activities during COVID-19 pandemic situation.

(The NADI Secretariat has updated the TOR after further negotiation and consultation with NADI Members).



ANNEX I

A. Suggested Meeting/Workshop Proceedings

1. It is suggested that the NADI Meeting or Workshop be held for two working days, where one and a half days will be dedicated for discussions in the meeting. The host may also organise a half day site visit. The sequence of events of each NADI Meeting or Workshop can be organised as follows:
 - a. The programme may begin with a welcome dinner on the first evening after the arrival of delegates.
 - b. On the first day, there could be welcome remarks by the host NADI Chairman to be followed by a keynote speech by a distinguished speaker, and then a group photograph-taking. The distinguished speaker is not expected to participate in the subsequent discussions by NADI delegates.
 - c. The Meeting/Workshop resumes with the adoption of the agenda and programme.
 - d. This may be followed by presentations on the agenda items, followed by a session for NADI delegates to exchange views on the relevant inputs and policy recommendations to be submitted to the ADMM track.
 - e. This could then be followed by an agenda item on “Other Matters” where updates on NADI Workshops, and other matters which the NADI Secretariat and other NADI delegations may raise. New Workshops can be proposed under this session. The NADI delegation proposing a new Workshop should give a brief presentation on the theme, purpose and objectives of the workshop, for consideration of the meeting.



- f. The first day could conclude with the host preparing a draft Chairman’s Report for delegates to review in preparation for the consideration of the Chairman’s Report the following day. NADI delegates shall agree on the collective inputs and recommendations but reserve their right to retain their individual inputs and recommendations in their respective sections of the Chairman’s Report. However, other NADI delegates may still raise language or other clarification and this, together with the presenter’s replies, could be also reflected in the Chairman’s Report.
- g. There may be an official dinner that evening.
- h. In the morning of the second day, the NADI Annual Meeting/Workshop shall deliberate on the draft Chairman’s Report and adopt it.
- i. In the afternoon of the second day, the host may wish to arrange a site visit to a cultural or historical place, or to an institution of a defence and security nature which conducts activities relating to the meeting or workshop.
- j. Before the delegates’ departure, the host could provide each delegation a CD or thumbdrive containing some photographs of the meeting and the Chairman’s Report.



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Strategic Studies Center,
National Defence Studies Institute

62 Vibhavadi Rangsit Rd., Dindaeng, Bangkok, 10400, Thailand.
Tel. & Fax : +66 2275 5716, Website : www.sscthailand.org, www.ssc.rtarf.mi.th