

Security in the 21st Century

Hybrid Warfare and

Comprehensive Security

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Outline


- Introduction
- Hybrid Threats
- Comprehensive Security

Introduction

- นรม. และ ผบ ทบ พูดยถึง Hybrid Warfare แต่ยังไม่อาจจะสืบสันเรื่อง ความหมาย และนิยามที่เกี่ยวข้อง (ควรใช้ Hybrid Threats)
- เนื่องจากเป็นเรื่องใหม่ เป็นภัยคุกคามในรูปแบบใหม่ ซึ่งเรายังไม่มี หลักนิยม และโครงสร้างรองรับ
- ยังไม่มีนิยามทหารที่เป็นสากล
- ปกติ ในแง่ทางการเมือง เราจะไม่ใช่คำว่า Warfare เพราะสังคมจะ เข้าใจว่า เป็นแนวคิดทหารสำหรับ ต่อสู้กับประชาชน


What is Hybrid Warfare?

- [Hybrid warfare](#) is an emerging, but ill-defined notion in conflict studies. It refers to the use of unconventional methods as part of a multi-domain warfighting approach. These methods aim to disrupt and disable an opponent's actions without engaging in open hostilities.
- While the concept is fairly new, its effects and outcomes are often in the headlines today. Russia's approach to Ukraine is an [example](#) of this form of warfare. It has involved a combination of activities, including disinformation, economic manipulation, use of proxies and insurgencies, diplomatic pressure and military actions.
- The term hybrid warfare originally referred to irregular non-state actors with advanced military capabilities. For example, in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, Hezbollah employed a host of different tactics against Israel. They included guerilla warfare, [innovative use of technology](#) and effective information campaigning.
- Following that war, in 2007, American defence researcher [Frank Hoffman](#) expanded on the terms "hybrid threat" and "hybrid warfare" to describe employing multiple, diverse tactics simultaneously against an opponent.






Russian Style *Hybrid Warfare* in Ukraine



The "paradoxical" Trinity of Hybrid Warfare

Three key characteristics / tendencies & their hybrid interaction / orchestration



Targets of hybrid attacks

Political dimension

- Elections
- Key decision makers
- Legislation and regulations
- Image of the state
- The role of the state internationally
- Foreign investments climate

Social dimension

- State stability
- Trust towards the government
- Potential for mobilizing protesters
- Radicalization
- Deepening of social/ethnic conflicts

Economic dimension

- Limiting investor's choice
- Influence on company's leadership and decisions
- Reputation
- Foreign cooperation
- Market value of companies
- Brand

"Hybrid policy"

This is a geopolitical category, aimed at subordinating domestic and foreign policy of another state with the help of a wide range of measures

Measures of "hybrid policy"

Political

Diplomatical

Trade and economic

Information-propaganda

Unconventional, "asymmetric"

Components of today's Russia's "hybrid policy"

Plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons

Plans for implementation of all sorts of projects like "Novorossia" ("New Russia") and others

Plans for a large-scale military operation against Ukraine

Recognition of the legitimacy of the Crimea's belonging to Russia in exchange for ending the war

Resuscitation of the ideas of the "Second Yalta" and the "Second Potsdam"

Spreading information that the United States has "given away" Ukraine to Moscow in exchange for Russia's support of Syria

Propagation of the ideas of federalization of Ukraine or "freezing" the conflict

Preparations for a "hybrid war" against the Baltic countries, etc.

Plans for building a gas pipeline to Europe bypassing Ukraine, or to China and Japan

Existence of a direct NATO/USA's "threat" to the Russian Federation

All this is done in the form of threats, intimidations, fakes, rumors, "information bombs"

NEW ERA OF GLOBAL COMPETITION
ASYMMETRICAL HYBRID WARFARE

THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD IS EVERYWHERE

UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

NON-MILITARY

- Economic Warfare*
- Financial Warfare*
- Transaction Warfare*
- Trade Warfare*
- Resources Warfare*
- Regulatory Warfare*
- Legal Warfare*
- Education Warfare*
- Technological Warfare*
- Sanction Warfare
- Media Warfare
- Propaganda Warfare
- Culture Warfare
- Ideological Warfare
- Religious Warfare
- Poisoning Warfare

TRANS-MILITARY

- Espionage Warfare*
- Information Warfare*
- Intelligence Warfare*
- Industrial Warfare*
- Resources Warfare*
- Pirating Warfare*
- DarkNet Warfare*
- Smuggling Warfare*
- CYBER WARFARE**
- Drug Warfare*
- Infiltration Warfare*
- Deterrence Warfare*
- Psychological Warfare
- Diplomatic Warfare
- Subversion Warfare
- Environmental Warfare

MILITARY

- Biological Warfare
- Chemical Warfare
- Ecological Warfare
- Space Warfare / EMP
- Electronic Warfare
- Guerrilla Warfare
- Terrorist Warfare
- Conventional Warfare
- Kinetic 'Smart' Warfare
- Nuclear Warfare


"ANYTHING WARFARE"
ABSENT OF ANY RULES

Espionage is the core focus and fabric of AHW
* Related to Economic and Transaction Warfare
Cyber Warfare functions as the key accelerator
to all warfare methods

The Concept of Hybrid Warfare

Help us think about, debate and prepare for the future

Need to rethink our understanding of victory?



Characteristics of Hybrid Warfare



Clausewitz: “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given cause”

Source:

- HYBRID WARFARE ASSESSMENT – FOLLOW-ON TASKING FROM THE WALES SUMMIT, 7 Nov 2014
- *Hybrid Warfare*, edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, Cambridge University Press









Figure 1. Evolution of Hybrid Warfare. Source: Author.

Miscalculation (overestimating)



-  Own estimate of state of conflict
-  Other's estimate of state of conflict
-  Intensity level of specific hybrid warfare measure



Armed Attack:

- Military operations
- Military operational intelligence activities

Use or Threat of Force:

- Economic sanctions
- Gunboat Diplomacy (Strategic Deployment)

Intervention:

- Diplomatic talks or pressure
- Formation of a political opposition
- Official protests
- Recourse to international or regional judicial or political organizations



Hybrid Warfare

- Military Strategy? Or National Security Strategy?
- Political Warfare
- Conventional Warfare
- Irregular Warfare
- Cyber Warfare
- Information Warfare ([fake news](#)),
- Diplomacy
- Lawfare
- Foreign Election Intervention.
- By combining kinetic with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution.

Notes

- US military Multi Domains Operation (To Counter China's and Russia's AA/AD Strategy)
- Grey Zone Operation
- US Army School Published Manual for Regime Change Intervention
- Israel defines Hybrid Warfare as Social Warfare



The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028



6 December 2018

Tenets of the Multi-Domain Operations

- The Army solves the problems presented by Chinese and Russian operations in competition and conflict by applying three interrelated tenets: calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence.
- Calibrated force posture is the combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances.
- Multi-domain formations possess the capacity, capability, and endurance necessary to operate across multiple domains in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary.
- Convergence is rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative.
- The three tenets of the solution are mutually reinforcing and common to all Multi-Domain Operations, though how they are realized will vary by echelon and depend upon the specific operational situation.

What is Grey Zone?

Related to hybrid warfare, the term [political warfare](#) commonly refers to power being employed to achieve national objectives in a way that falls short of physical conflict.

Such warfare is conducted in the “grey zone” of conflict, meaning operations may not clearly cross the threshold of war. That might be due to the ambiguity of international law, ambiguity of actions and attribution, or because the impact of the activities does not justify a response.

Recent discussions, including last week’s speeches, focus on the newer aspects of these concepts – specifically activities in the information domain.

Our increasing connectivity and reliance on information technology is a vulnerability that is being targeted by two key threats: cyber attacks, and the subversion of our democratic institutions and social cohesion. Both are [recognised challenges](#) to our national security.

These are “hybrid threats” as they may be employed as part of a broader campaign – including political, criminal and economic activities. And because they feature the ambiguity associated with the grey zone, they are well suited to achieve political outcomes without resorting to traditional conflict.

While cyber attacks are carried out by a variety of actors, there is an ongoing low intensity cyber conflict between nation states. This includes attacks and counter-attacks on critical infrastructure, such as power grids, [reported](#) between the US and Russia.

Grey Zone Operation

- Public speeches by Australian Defence Force Chiefs are irregular enough that people sat up and took notice when General Angus Campbell used his [address](#) at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's 2019 "[War in 2025](#)" conference to outline the increasing threat represented by [political warfare](#) – a term not likely to be familiar to the average Australian.
- Political warfare involves so-called [grey-zone operations](#) or [hybrid warfare](#), which include activities such as subversion, [foreign interference](#) and utilization of [unmarked military forces](#). These measures are provocative and escalating but still designed to be non-kinetic and non-lethal. As they aim below the threshold of outright warfare, they do not necessitate or justify a warlike response.

Grey Zone Operation

The 'grey zone' has received much publicity over the past decade as certain nation-states have employed indirect methods to gain advantages over their opponents without resorting to open kinetic warfare.

Grey zones can be an important element of 'hybrid warfare'.

The definition of hybrid warfare remains subject to debate, but inherent in the term is the idea that covert and unconventional methods, which may include non-kinetic effects, are employed in addition to conventional military force.

Grey Zone Operation

- Grey zone operations are coercive and intended to achieve change, but they seek at the same time to limit an adversary's ability to respond.
- In most, but not all, circumstances, [they're](#) 'deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war' and 'are meant to achieve ... gains without escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring'.
- While a substantial proportion of such operations have occurred purely on land in recent years, such as the Russian-sponsored campaigns in Georgia and Ukraine, they have also been used at sea and to key strategic effect.



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Recent grey-zone activity in maritime Asia suggests an increase in hybrid warfare. The lines between military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and criminal means of aggression are becoming increasingly blurred.

Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects:

A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state. For example, in the [Israel–Hezbollah War](#) and the [Syrian Civil War](#) the main adversaries are non-state entities within the state system. These non-state actors can act as [proxies](#) for countries but have independent agendas as well. For example, [Iran](#) is a sponsor of [Hezbollah](#) but it was Hezbollah's, not Iran's, agenda that resulted in the kidnapping of Israeli troops that led to the Israel–Hezbollah war. On the other hand, [Russian involvement in Ukraine](#) can be described as a traditional state actor waging a hybrid war (in addition to using a local hybrid proxy). Note that [Russia](#) denies involvement in the Ukraine conflict.

Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects:

- *Non-standard, Complex, and Fluid adversary*
- *Hybrid adversary can be State or Non-state*
- *Examples:*
- *Israel Hizbollah war*
- *Syria Civil War*
- *Russia Involvement in Ukraine*

Counteracting Russia's propaganda

Enemy's actions



Creation of an efficient system of the information security of Ukraine



Requirements to Ukraine's Intelligence Agencies in the Context of the "Hybrid War"

Doing all kinds of intelligence with the use of a wide range of methods and means



Counteracting the enemy's "throwing in" of corrupted information (disinformation)



Intelligence in the situation of unpredictability and difficulties with forecasting the developments



Intelligence in constant changing of the nature of threats, variability of the aggressor's tactics



Photos from the site of the Main Directorate of Military Intelligence of Ukraine

Deep analysis of the intelligence and timely information and intelligence support to the top state and military leadership for making decisions in the sphere of national (military) security create favorable conditions for winning a victory in the "hybrid war»

Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects:

- *Uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods.*
- Methods and tactics includes:
- [conventional capabilities](#), [irregular tactics](#), irregular formations, diplomacy, politics, [terrorist acts](#), indiscriminate violence, and criminal activity.
- A hybrid adversary also uses clandestine actions to avoid attribution or retribution.
- These methods are used simultaneously across the spectrum of conflict with a unified strategy.
- A current example is the [Islamic State's](#) transnational aspirations, blended tactics, structured formations, and cruel use of [terror](#) as part of their arsenal.

Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects:

- *A hybrid adversary is flexible and adapts quickly.*
- For example, the [Islamic State's](#) response to the U.S. aerial bombing campaign was to quickly reduce the use of [checkpoints](#), large convoys, and cell phones.
- IS militants also dispersed among the civilian population. Civilian [collateral damage](#) from airstrikes can be used as an effective recruiting tool.

Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects:

A hybrid adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies. These weapons can be now bought at bargain prices. Moreover, other novel technologies are being adapted to the battlefield such as cellular networks. In 2006, [Hezbollah](#) was armed with high-tech weaponry, such as [precision guided missiles](#), that [nation-states](#) typically use. Hezbollah forces shot down [Israeli](#) helicopters, severely damaged a patrol boat with a [cruise missile](#) and destroyed heavily armored tanks by firing [guided missiles](#) from hidden bunkers. The organization also used [aerial drones](#) to gather intelligence, communicated with encrypted cell phones and watched Israeli troop movements with thermal [night-vision equipment](#).

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
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
- *Use of mass communication for propaganda.* The growth of mass communication networks offers powerful propaganda and recruiting tools. The use of fake news websites to spread false stories is an element of hybrid warfare.
- *A hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields. the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community.*

HYBRID WARFARE AND THE CONCEPT OF INTERFACES

Operating in the Shadow / Grey Area of Interfaces



RUS Hybrid Warfare 'Hydra': Deployable abroad and inside Russia



Mark Voyger © 2015

1

REGULAR
MILITARY
FORCES

กำลังทหาร
ปกติ

2

SPECIAL
FORCES

กำลังทหาร
พิเศษ

3

IRREGULAR
FORCES

กองกำลัง
ที่ไม่ใช่ทหาร

4

SUPPORT
OF LOCAL
UNREST

การสนับสนุน
จากประชาชน
ในท้องถิ่น

5

INFORMATION
WARFARE
PROPAGANDA

สงครามข้อมูล
ข่าวสาร และการ
โฆษณาชวนเชื่อ

6

DIPLOMACY

การทูต

7

CYBER
ATTACKS

การโจมตี
ด้านไซเบอร์

8

ECONOMIC
WARFARE

สงคราม
เศรษฐกิจ

1 และ 2 เป็นอำนาจของรัฐ

สงครามลูกผสม

HYBRID WARFARE

Comprehensive Security

- Social
- Technology
- Economic
- Environment
- Politic
- Military

Comprehensive Security : STEEPM

STEEP Framework



What is STEEP Analysis?

- The **STEEP** analysis tool is a framework to gauge how the external environment will impact a given company's strategic plan to remain competitive.
- **STEEP** is an acronym for: **Social, Technological, Economic, Ecological (Environmental) and Political**. Other known acronyms derived from STEEP are: PEST, PESTLE, PESTEL, STEP, STEPJE, STEEPLED and LEPEST. The STEEP acronym is well known and used all over the world as a basis for external analysis.

STEEP-
M

- Age of Uncertainty
- Strategic Agility

War or peace?

Understanding the grey zone.

Discipline in definition

The impulse to designate this domain as a place of conflict rather than competition is strong. After all, conflict is more likely to command attention and resources than peace. Yet much, but not all, of what we see being conducted in this space could be characterised as features of the difficult, new peace as much as the new warfare. The range of means being used to project state power is wide and the tempo fierce, but that does not mean that a state of war exists. The contestation we are seeing through unregulated means, in particular in the field of information and subversion, might for all its bumpiness be what the new peace rather than the new war looks like.

The so-called 'battlespace' needs decluttering by designating with rigour what activities by foreign states are 'warlike', in that they are tantamount to the use of force, and which ones amount to unregulated (and possibly unlawful) competition. Understanding the difference will help to determine appropriate responses. It will also encourage a more careful use of martial language and a better understanding of the inherent risks of choosing to adopt it.

Broadening the range of activities that are classified as belligerent effectively lowers the threshold for escalation. Governments can't not respond if they talk of their jurisdiction being attacked. But if they use the language of peacetime, even if the peace is a dirty one, the threshold will be higher. It leaves room for competition, engagement and arbitration. It may ultimately, and importantly, allow for the evolution of rules.

Calibration of response

Sufficient political capacity and appetite needs to be conserved for responding to egregious threats, rather than allowing it to be dissipated in adversarial responses to all perceived activities in the grey zone, many of which constitute a crude form of competition.

There is a conceptual difficulty here, especially for Western powers, whose tolerance for what constitutes competition may have changed in tandem with the shifting balance of global power. Many grey zone activities are functions of a rewired and restructured global economy. To take three of the most potent weapons – information, credit and capital – these used to be monopolised by the same powers that possessed superior firepower and moral authority, namely the US and its allies. That is no longer the case. The weapons, the power and the narratives are more disparately distributed.

China is using its capital and extending its credit on a scale previously unimaginable, and the strategy is paying dividends. Russia has become the most subversive player in cyber space, while China is helping itself to Western IP. It is no surprise that in this new ranking competition is tough and unsettling for those who used to dominate, and it feels sufficiently hostile to be a war.

States will continue to conduct hostile actions against or in foreign jurisdictions by clandestine or deniable means. These actions can be breathtakingly aggressive and occasionally heinous. This small category of activities can constitute a war-like act. Salisbury was close. Sustained cyber pillaging or disabling of national infrastructure might qualify. But the category is best dealt with through existing conventions, robustly applied by law-enforcement agencies and legally governed by intelligence and security counter measures.

Promotion of regulation

Activities in the grey zone are subject to very little, if any, regulation. It is fanciful to imagine a regulatory agreement between states on intelligence or information operations other than in the most exceptional circumstances. But it is possible to imagine at least hot-line exchanges over the most egregious examples of grey zone activity and, incrementally, a setting of boundaries. Historically, this is how regulation to manage new weapons systems has evolved.

More importantly perhaps, it is now possible to imagine the development of a relationship between states and tech and media companies around the ways in which their services are used for propaganda or subversive purposes. There is a delicate balance to be struck between their liberties and new responsibilities, which come as a consequence of being distinctive and powerful actors in the grey zone. There is much to build on given the progress that has made in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation.

The strategic goal should be to extend existing conventions and regulations into the activities and means observed in the grey zone. That will require sustained, multilateral effort, and the gains will be incremental. But it will result in the promotion of the rule of law and an inclusion of the grey zone in the realm of peaceful relations between states. The danger is to accept that the grey zone is by definition a place where rules do not apply and that it is growing. This encourages bad behaviour on all sides and raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. Pacifying the grey zone could prove to be the generational challenge for those states committed to updating and preserving the rule of law.

What's need to be done?

- Offensive Hybrid Warfare
- Defense Hybrid Warfare
- Strategic = Comprehensive security
- Operational? Tactical?
- No Framework, no Doctrines

Q & A